MuSig
Bitcoin-S now has support for MuSig.
This module contains classes representing public KeySet
s, MuSig nonces, and MuSig aggregate key tweaks, as well as utility functions for all MuSig computations.
The functions for aggregating key data are:
aggPubKey
- This is a member of
KeySet
and returns the aggregate public key for this set of signers, including the tweaks provided. In most uses, a subsequent call toschnorrPublicKey
is required for Bitcoin applications.
- This is a member of
MuSigNoncePub.aggregate
- Given a
Vector[MuSigNoncePub]
of the signer's nonces, returns the aggregateMuSigNoncePub
. This aggregation can be done before the message, or even theKeySet
is known.
- Given a
The functions for signing and verification are:
MuSigUtil.sign
- This function generates a MuSig partial signature using a private key and
MuSigNoncePriv
. This consists of a pair(R, s)
whereR
is the aggregate nonce key (same for all signers) ands
is the actual partial signature that needs to be shared.
- This function generates a MuSig partial signature using a private key and
MuSigUtil.partialSigVerify
- This function validates a single partial signature against that signer's public key and
MuSigNoncePub
.
- This function validates a single partial signature against that signer's public key and
MuSigUtil.signAgg
- This function aggregates all of the
s
values into a single validSchnorrDigitalSignature
(using the aggregate nonce keyR
).
- This function aggregates all of the
Note that no new function is required for aggregate verification as SchnorrPublicKey
's verify
function is to be used.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that MuSigNoncePriv
s must be constructed using either MuSigNoncePriv.gen
or MuSigNoncePriv.genInternal
(the latter should only be used with 32 bytes of secure random entropy). These generation functions take as input any context information that is available at nonce generation time, namely your signing key, aggregate public key, message, and any extra bytes you may have available. Including these optional inputs improves the security of nonce generation (which must be absolutely secure).
The following code shows a two-party MuSig execution:
// Alice and Bob generate and exchange nonce data (new nonces for every sig)
val aliceNoncePriv = MuSigNoncePriv.gen()
val aliceNonce = aliceNoncePriv.toPublicNonces // Alice sends this to Bob
val bobNoncePriv = MuSigNoncePriv.gen()
val bobNonce = bobNoncePriv.toPublicNonces // Bob sends this to Alice
// The aggregate musig nonce can be computed from Alice's and Bob's
val aggMuSigNonce = MuSigNoncePub.aggregate(Vector(aliceNonce, bobNonce))
// Any party can (non-interactively) compute the aggregate public key
val pubKeys = Vector(alicePubKey, bobPubKey)
val keySet = KeySet(pubKeys, tweaks) // This is where you put MuSigTweaks
val aggPubKey = keySet.aggPubKey.schnorrPublicKey
// Alice generates a partial signature for the message
val (aliceR, aliceSig) =
MuSigUtil.sign(aliceNoncePriv, aggMuSigNonce, alicePrivKey, msg, keySet)
// Bob generates a partial signature for the message
val (bobR, bobSig) =
MuSigUtil.sign(bobNoncePriv, aggMuSigNonce, bobPrivKey, msg, keySet)
require(aliceR == bobR)
val R = aliceR
// Alice and Bob exchange and verify each other's sigs (s values)
require(
MuSigUtil.partialSigVerify(aliceSig,
aliceNonce,
aggMuSigNonce,
alicePubKey,
keySet,
msg))
require(
MuSigUtil.partialSigVerify(bobSig,
bobNonce,
aggMuSigNonce,
bobPubKey,
keySet,
msg))
// In the case that the aggregator is not Alice or Bob, R can be computed as follows
val R2 = SigningSession(aggMuSigNonce, keySet, msg).aggNonce
require(R2 == R)
// Finally, any party can aggregate the partial signatures
val sig = MuSigUtil.signAgg(Vector(aliceSig, bobSig), R)
// This signature can now be validated as a normal BIP340 Schnorr signature
require(aggPubKey.verify(msg, sig))